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Summary 
This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt 
a neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote 
them. The rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and 
value-decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante whether they are of the former or the 
latter kind. Unfortunately, takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad 
takeovers while at the same time promoting the good ones. Further, contestability of control 
is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact on managers’ and block-holders’ incentives 
to make firm-specific investments of human capital, which in turn affects firm value. It is 
t h u s  a r g u e d  t h a t  i n d i v i d u a l  c o m p a n i e s  s h o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  d e c i d e  h o w  c o n t e s t a b l e  t h e i r  
control should be. After showing that the current EC legal framework for takeovers overall 
hinders takeover activity in the EU, the paper identifies three rationales for a takeover-
neutral intervention of the EC in the area of takeover regulation (pre-emption of “takeover-
hostile,” protectionist national regulations, opt-out rules protecting shareholders vis-à-vis 
managers’ and dominant shareholders’ opportunism in takeover contexts, and menu rules 
helping individual companies define their degree of control contestability) and provides 
examples of rules that may respond to such rationales.  
 
Keywords: Takeover Bid Directive, Board Neutrality, Mandatory Bid Rule, Market for 
Corporate Control  
 
JEL Classification: K22, G34, G38  
 
I wish to thank Alessio Pacces, who is also the coauthor of a companion paper, Paul Davies, Matteo 
Gargantini, Matteo Gatti, Peter Mülbert, and participants to the 13th Annual Conference of the Irish 
European Law Forum, UCD School of Law, Dublin, 4 December 2009, for their comments to earlier 
drafts. Views expressed in this paper are exclusively the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of 













Via G.B. Martini 3 
00198 Rome 
Italy 
Phone: +39 06 84 77 235 
E-mail: l.enriques@consob.it  









This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a 
neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote them. The 
rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and value-
decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante which kind they are. Unfortunately, takeover rules 
cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad takeovers while at the same time promoting the 
good ones. Further, contestability of control is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact 
on managers’ and block-holders’ incentives to make firm-specific investments of human capital, 
which in turn affects firm value. It is thus argued that individual companies should be able to 
decide how contestable their control should be. After showing that the current EU legal 
framework for takeovers overall hinders takeover activity in the EU, the paper identifies three 
rationales for a takeover-neutral intervention of the EU in the area of takeover regulation (pre-
emption of “takeover-hostile,” protectionist national regulations, opt-out rules protecting 
shareholders vis-à-vis managers’ and dominant shareholders’ opportunism in takeover 
contexts, and menu rules helping individual companies define their degree of control 
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1.  Introduction 
Both before and after the adoption of the Takeover Bid Directive
1 (TBD), the 
policy debate on European Takeover law has almost exclusively focused on how 
contestable European companies should be.
2 Commentators generally agree that “[t]he 
true main goal of the Takeover Directive [is][] the maximization of takeovers – i.e. the 
facilitation of as many takeovers as ‘the market’ desires.”
3 If that is true, then the TBD 
was indeed a spectacular failure, much less for what it did not do (it failed to impose the 
board neutrality rule and the break-through rule) than for what it positively did. In fact, 
as section 3 and 4 show, many EU rules hinder takeover activity rather than promoting 
it. That is because in general policymakers have a tendency to enact rules that protect 
incumbent managers or controlling shareholders from the market for corporate control. 
Such a pro-incumbent approach has so much characterized national takeover laws in the 
past decades that the starting point for EU intervention in the area was one displaying a 
number of national anti-takeover measures. It was only natural for the EU to include 
them in the TBD in its attempt to provide a single EU-wide legal framework for 
takeovers. By doing so, however, it took national anti-takeover provisions under its 
                                                 
1 Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids of 21 April 2004, OJ L 142, 30.4.2004, p. 12–23. 
2 See e.g. Klaus J. Hopt, Takeover regulation in Europe -- The battle for the 13th directive on takeovers, 
15 AUST. J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Vanessa Edwards, The directive on takeover bids – Not Worth the Paper 
it’s Written on?, 1 ECFR 416 (2004). 
3 Beate Sjåfjell, Towards a Sustainable European Company Law 166 (2009). 3 
 
wings, thereby extending them to all EU states and petrifying them at least until the 
review of the TBD.
4  
When the time for the review of the TBD comes in 2011,
5 the European 
Commission will predictably try to push for more mandatory rules, such as the ones it 
failed to impose in 2004, to tilt the current legal framework in the direction of more 
contestability (I call this possible outcome an “enhanced TBD regime”). It is highly 
unlikely that a similar attempt will be more successful in 2011 than in the first half of 
the 2000s:
6 national governments’ protectionist instincts have, if anything, strengthened 
since then. 
This contribution outlines an alternative regulatory approach to takeovers with 
specific reference to the EU framework. It argues that EU law should adopt a 
consciously neutral approach to takeovers, i.e. it should aim neither to make European 
companies easier to take over nor hinder the functioning of the market for corporate 
control by making takeovers more costly and therefore more rare. Section 2 articulates 
this claim based on the hardly contestable proposition that takeovers as such are neither 
good (value-creating) nor bad (value-destroying): there are good and bad takeovers, but 
takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad ones while at the same time 
promoting all the good ones. After showing that EU rules are overall “takeover-hostile” 
in Sections 3 and 4, Section 5 illustrates how a takeover-neutral EU legal framework 
would look like. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
4 On the petrification effect of EU (company) law see Richard M. Buxbaum and Klaus J. Hopt, Legal 
Harmonization and The Business Enterprise 243 (1988). 
5 Article 20 TBD provides that in 2011 the European Commission shall “examine this Directive in the 
light of the experience acquired in applying it and, if necessary, propose its revision. That examination 
shall include a survey of the control structures and barriers to takeover bids that are not covered by this 
Directive.” 
6 See Blanaid Clarke, Reinforcing the Market for Corporate Control 5 (August 2010). UCD Working 




2.  The economic rationale of a neutral approach 
Takeovers perform two functions: they discipline managers and reallocate 
control. Let us first consider takeovers as a discipline device. Their positive effects on 
managerial agency costs are impossible to quantify, if only because it is the mere 
possibility of a takeover that aligns managers’ interests to those of shareholders. While 
these benefits may be substantial,
7 the available empirical evidence shows that hostile 
takeovers that do occur are not targeted at underperforming companies.
8 Further, this 
disciplinary device also has a negative side. The threat of hostile takeovers does not 
allow managers to protect their firm-specific investments, which are potentially 
valuable also for shareholders (and other stakeholders). If managers face the risk of 
being ousted following a hostile takeover, they will tend to make less human capital 
investments of this kind.
9  
The second function of takeovers (control reallocation) is equally important, but 
unfortunately this market is far from perfect. Shareholders’ collective action problems 
on the one hand and the presence of private benefits of control on the other can lead 
both to the failure of value-increasing takeovers and to the success of value-decreasing 
ones.  
First, shareholders’ collective action problems can distort the outcome of 
takeovers because of the free riding problem. A prospective acquirer will launch a 
tender offer if the gains exceed the costs. In principle, this is done by identifying 
                                                 
7 See most recently Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken, 118-
122 (2008). 
8 See e.g. G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN. 2599 
(2000) (evidence for the US); Julian Franks, Colin Mayer, and Luc Renneboog, Who Disciplines 
Management in Poorly Performing Companies?, 10 J. FIN INT. 209 (2001) (evidence for the UK). 
9 For an overview of the literature see Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa Röell, Corporate Law and 
Governance, in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell (Eds), Handbook of Law and Economics, 833, 
851-852 (2007). 5 
 
undervalued companies, bidding for all of their shares at a price (slightly) above the 
current one, and, after the purchase, profiting from bringing stock returns to full 
potential.
10 Unfortunately, due to target shareholders’ collective action problems, this 
strategy is not as easy to implement as it looks. Anticipating the higher stock returns, an 
individually rational shareholder prefers not to tender hoping that the other shareholders 
will, so as to free ride on the takeover gains.
11 Dispersed shareholders, being unable to 
coordinate, will all think the same, leading to the takeover failure. That is, unless, of 
course, the bidder offers them the entire expected post-takeover value increase. But that 
would deprive the bidder of any profit, which means that she will not launch the bid to 
begin with.  
Free riding is less severe in the real world than theory predicts, but the 
substantial gains accruing to target shareholders are evidence of its existence.
12 One 
prominent reason why the free riding problem is not as extreme as theory predicts is that 
target shareholders face a second collective action problem, i.e. pressure to tender.
13 
Because they decide whether to tender based on the expected post-takeover share value 
relative to the bid price, bidders can force shareholders to tender by “fixing” a post-
takeover value for holding-out shareholders lower than the bid price. One way to 
implement this strategy is by declaring in advance that after the takeover the target 
company will be merged into the parent company on the basis of an exchange ratio that 
values the target shares less than the bid price (that, of course, in jurisdictions where 
company and securities laws do not forbid a similar merger). While such an acquisition 
                                                 
10 See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965). 
11 This problem was first discussed analytically by Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart, Takeover 
Bids, The Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980). 
12 See Burkart and Panunzi, Takeovers, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 118/2006, 12-17. 
13 See e.g. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, in 12 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 911 (1987). 6 
 
structure effectively solves the free riding problem, it prompts dispersed target 
shareholders to accept even bids in which the expected post-takeover value is lower 
than the pre-acquisition value. In other words, it makes even value-decreasing bids 
possible.
14 
All major jurisdictions, including EU ones and the EU itself, provide for rules 
that aim to solve, or at least alleviate, the pressure to tender problem. In doing so, 
however, they bring back the free riding problem to the foreground and therefore 
negatively affect value-increasing bids. They also make all tender offers more costly, 
and therefore less profitable for bidders. At the margin, thus, they have a negative 
impact on value-increasing takeover bid activity.  
An alternative to laws aimed to protect target shareholders against pressure to 
tender is to let individual companies themselves devise contractual solutions to it, such 
as charter provisions granting a majority of the shareholders or the corporate board a 
veto over the takeover. A private ordering solution to the free riding and pressure to 
tender problems has the great advantage of allowing for adaption of the response to the 
specific characters of each individual company. Whether a company’s control should be 
more or less contestable is in fact a function of a number of variables, such as its 
ownership structure, the levels and kind of private benefits available to those in control 
and the relative importance of managerial firm-specific human capital investments. A 
company’s shareholders, whether at the IPO stage or mid-stream, are ultimately in the 
best position to strike the balance between all such variables. A one-size-fits-all solution 
devised by lawmakers will inevitably make some companies more open to the market 
                                                 
14 See e.g. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, 76 
AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 7 
 
for corporate control, and some others more protected from its disciplining and/or re-
allocation effects, than it would be optimal. 
The framework is different in the presence of a controlling shareholder, but 
again control transfers can be value-creating as well as value-decreasing and the 
conclusion to be reached is the same as before, i.e. private ordering is better than one-
size-fits-all solutions. Here, changes in control are normally operated by voluntary 
exchanges of the controlling block.
15  The main problem is that the acquirer’s gains can 
come from the extraction of higher pecuniary private benefits of control and/or from 
better management, synergies and so on. If the difference between the seller’s private 
benefits of control and the acquirer’s is negative and significant enough, the acquirer 
can profit from the transaction even if the overall value of the company under her 
control is lower than under the seller’s. In other words, the acquirer’s gains can be the 
minority shareholders’ losses. A solution to this problem is the mandatory bid, which 
forces the acquirer to extend to minority shareholders the same terms of purchase 
offered to the seller, thereby ruling out inefficient takeovers. Unfortunately, the 
mandatory bid also reduces the number of successful value-increasing takeovers, 
because of the additional costs of paying the control premium to minority shareholders. 
The negative impact of mechanisms protecting minority shareholders from 
expropriation in negotiated control transfer settings generally depends on the relative 
importance of private benefits of control for the seller and the acquirer,
16 which in turn 
depends on factors like ownership structure, the company’s business, the regulatory and 
                                                 
15 For a comprehensive analysis of this setting, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Efficient and Inefficient Sales of 
Corporate Control, 109 Q. J. ECON. 957 (1994). 
16 For instance, inefficient control transfers are bound not to happen when the seller’s and the acquirer’s 
private benefits are of the same order of magnitude. In this situation, the mandatory bid has only adverse 
consequences on value-increasing takeovers. See Mike Burkart and Fausto Panunzi, Mandatory Bids, 
Squeeze-Out, Sell-Out and the Dynamics of the Tender Offer Process, in Guido Ferrarini, Klaus J. Hopt, 
Jaap Winter and Eddy Wymeersch eds., Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe, 737, 761 
(2004). 8 
 
political environment, and so on. Then, again, the decision on whether to sacrifice 
efficient allocation of corporate control in the name of investor protection (or vice-
versa) should be left to individual companies. 
To conclude, takeover regulation should be as neutral as possible, i.e. be 
designed in such a way as to neither hamper nor promote takeovers via (inevitably) one-
size-fits-all solutions. This implies mainly deferring to private parties’ choices, but there 
still is a role for the law to play, and especially for EU (or federal) law, as section 5 
shows. Before describing how a takeover-neutral EU law would look like, let us see 
how distant current EU law is from this approach.   
 
3.  The current EU approach: (1) the few rules promoting takeovers 
As we have seen in the previous section, the market for corporate control and 
hostile takeovers more specifically are considered to be highly effective in disciplining 
managers and are thus a powerful market-based tool to indirectly protect the interests of 
shareholders. Further, a market in which hostile takeovers can more easily succeed is 
also one in which cross-border acquisitions will be more frequent, and thus a more 
integrated one. Rules promoting takeovers are therefore justified both because they 
indirectly protect the interests of shareholders (Article 50(2)(g) of the Treaty on the 
functioning of the European Union) and because they are instrumental to market 
integration, one of the fundamental objectives of the European Union. It is thus 
surprising how few the provisions of this kind are in EC Directives generally, and even 
specifically in the TBD. Here is the list:
17 
                                                 
17 The list includes some rules that only have the indirect effect of promoting takeovers. Other rules can 
be held to have such an indirect impact, such as those making it easier for shareholders to exercise their 
rights. I have, however, decided not to include them, subjectively categorising them as having too indirect 9 
 
a.  Articles 9, 11, and 12 of the TBD, requiring Member States to at least allow 
companies to opt for the board neutrality rule and the break-through rule;
18  
b.  At least if broadly construed, the Second Company Law Directive’s provisions 
on pre-emptive rights and equal treatment (Articles 29 and 42) rule out the 
possibly most effective defensive device, i.e. the US-style poison pill;
19 
c.  The Second Company Law Directive itself makes it harder for boards to adopt 
other defensive strategies, such as leveraged cash-outs (due to limits on 
distributions and rules requiring a shareholder meeting resolution on buy 
backs),
20 targeted issues of shares (via rules requiring a shareholder meeting 
resolution to restrict or withdraw pre-emptive rights provisions);
21 and to 
execute leveraged management buy-outs;
22 
d.  Article 46 of Directive 2001/34/EC provides that shares admitted to official 
listing must be freely negotiable (para. (1)). A derogation to this principle, in 
the form of an approval of purchases of shares e.g. by the board, is only 
allowed “if the use of the approval clause does not disturb the market” (para. 
                                                                                                                                               
an impact on takeovers. What counts is that the list is exhaustive with regard to rules explicitly or 
specifically conceived of as pro-takeovers. 
18 To be sure, Article 3(1)(c) TBD spells out the principle that “the board of an offeree company must act 
in the interests of the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to 
decide on the merits of the bid.” It is doubtful, however, whether this principle has any operational value 
in the law in action for any company that is not subject to Articles 9 and 11. Similarly, the fact that the 
board neutrality and break-through rules are the “EU” default means these rules have hardly any 
operational impact, because member states can opt out. 
19 See e.g. Jeffrey N. Gordon, An American Perspective on Anti-Takeover Laws in the EU: The German 
Example, in Guido Ferrarini, Klaus J. Hopt, Jaap Winter and Eddy Wymeersch eds., Reforming Company 
and Takeover Law in Europe, 541, 551 n23 (2004). 
20 See Articles 15 (limits on distributions) and 19-22 (buy-backs). 
21 Article 29(4), Second Company Law Directive. See also Article 29(5) of the same, which allows 
member states to delegate the power to restrict or withdraw pre-emption rights to the body that has been 
delegated to issue new shares. 
22 Article 23a, Second Company Law Directive. 10 
 
(3)), a sufficiently vague formulation as to make board approval even of 
purchases of shares above a given threshold of dubious legality;
23 
e.  Article 10 of the TBD, requiring companies to provide detailed information on 
their ownership structures and any anti-takeover devices, thus lowering 
(however little) the costs potential bidders have to incur to identify targets; 
f.  Article 15 of the TBD, requiring member states to grant bidders squeeze-out 
rights at certain conditions, because squeeze-outs are an effective solution to 
the free riding problem;
24 
g.  Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No. 2273/2003, identifying the eligible purposes 
a company may pursue in order to be exempted from the market abuse 
prohibitions when buying its shares back (safe harbour).
25 Defending against a 
hostile bid is not one of them. Although operating outside the safe harbour 
should not per se be regarded as abusive, it entails a higher legal risk, therefore 
discouraging buy-backs as a defensive measure. 
 
4.  The current EU approach: (2) the many rules hindering takeovers 
We have seen that takeover bids can also harm shareholders’ interests by 
exploiting the collective action problem of the target shareholders as against the bidder. 
Other stakeholders, like creditors and employees, may also stand to lose if a takeover 
bid succeeds.
26 Under the implicit assumption that private parties themselves have no 
more efficient ways to address these problems, the TBD contains a number of 
                                                 
23 Cf. Guido Ferrarini, Le difese contro le o.p.a. ostili: analisi economica e comparazione, 2000 RIVISTA 
DELLE SOCIETÀ 737, 746 (describing national listing requirements requiring free transferability of shares 
and noting that the original intent of the EU provision was not to promote takeovers).  
24 See Burkart and Panunzi, supra note 16, at 747. 
25 Art. 3 of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2273/2003 of 22 December 2003. 
26 See Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law, 225, 229-30 (2d ed., 2009). 11 
 
provisions that, while providing safeguards for shareholders and other stakeholders, 
have a negative effect on takeover activity. Some provisions in other directives also 
have this indirect impact. Starting with the TBD, here is a list of its “takeover-hostile” 
provisions:
27 
a.  By providing for equivalent treatment of securities holders of the same class,
28 
the TBD appears to rule out the possibility of price discrimination and 
selective purchases at a higher price during the bid, which would otherwise 
help bidders lower the acquisition price and/or raise their chance of success;  
b.  In the context of hostile bids, the mandatory bid rule
29 prevents the bidder 
from using coercive bid structures such as partial offers (albeit only above the 
mandatory bid rule threshold, which is for the member states to define) and 
two-tier tender offers (whereby the price in the second stage of the offer is 
lower than in the first stage).
30 The mandatory bid rule also makes friendly 
acquisitions more costly: at the margin, some value-creating transactions may 
not go through because of such higher costs;
31  
c.  The TBD requires a minimum acceptance period of two weeks.
32 The 
provision raises the cost of acquisitions for bidders in various ways. First, it 
rules out coercive bids such as the notorious 1960s US “Saturday Night 
Specials,” an offer launched on Friday night and closing on Monday morning 
before stock exchange opening.
33 Second, the provision facilitates incumbent 
boards’ reaction. In fact, it raises the probability of a competing offer, whether 
                                                 
27 Cf. supra note 17 for a qualification. 
28 Article 3(1)(a). 
29 Article 5. 
30 See e.g. Paul Davies and Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, supra note 26, at 252-4. 
31 Id. at 259. 
32 Article 7(1). 
33 See e.g. Ronald J. Gilson and Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 734 
(1995). 12 
 
by a White Knight or by another third party. Finally, and less importantly, a 
longer offer period implies higher financing costs;  
d.  The Directive also requires bidders to submit a detailed offer document for 
authorization by the competent supervisory authority and to make it public,
34 
which has obvious costs, both direct and indirect (especially as regards the risk 
of liability suits and administrative or even criminal sanctions for incomplete 
or false information), and further delays completion of the transaction; 
e.  By requiring immediate disclosure of the intention to launch the bid,
35 the 
Directive restricts bidders’ discretion in deciding when to start their attack, 
possibly with negative implications, again, on the cost side and the chance of 
success. Specifically, it may hamper the bidder’s ability to build a sufficiently 
high toehold before share prices incorporate information about the takeover 
attempt. Further, it gives the target company more time to prepare defences or 
to find a White Knight; 
f.  The effect of curbing coercive practices and therefore of raising acquisition 
costs stems also from granting a sell-out right to remaining shareholders after 
highly successful completion of the bid (the threshold being between 90 and 
95 percent, depending on States’ choice). This is in fact like a second round as 
envisaged by the takeover regulations of some countries to avoid pressure to 
tender;
36 
g.  While requiring member states to include squeeze-out provisions in their 
takeover laws, the TBD prevents them from granting such right in broader 
terms than it envisages. For instance, member states may not allow successful 
                                                 
34 Article 6. 
35 Article 6(1). 
36 See e.g. Rule 31.4 of the the UK Takeover Code; for Germany, § 21(5) WpÜG.  13 
 
bidders to squeeze-out minorities after reaching a threshold lower than 90 per 
cent, again with a negative impact on takeover activity; 
h.  Finally, and least importantly, even the rule requiring target companies to 
“make public a document setting out its opinion of the bid” has an albeit trivial 
negative impact on takeover activity, because it requires target companies to 
bear the direct and indirect costs of preparing and publishing the document. Of 
course, target companies would always try to communicate with shareholders 
in the event of a hostile takeover. But they might keep silent when the bid is 
friendly.    
At least two other pieces of EU company law are to mention as “takeover-
hostile.” First and foremost, the Transparency Directive provisions requiring holders of 
stakes higher than 5 percent to inform the public about their stakes and any subsequent 
material change
37 have an apparent negative impact on takeover activity, as they 
directly affect the possibility of building toeholds while the market is still in the dark 
about a raider’s intentions.
38 Second, the Second Company Law Directive provides for 
particularly “onerous conditions”
39 for the legality of financial assistance transactions, 
thus curbing leveraged buy-out activity, however little.
40  
While non-binding for Member States, another piece of EU policymaking in the 
area of corporate law may affect takeover activity: the Commission Recommendation 
on the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies of 30 April 2009. If 
implemented by the Member States, the limits it sets on termination payments and share 
                                                 
37 Articles 9 and 10, Transparency Directive. 
38 See e.g. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
1028 (1982). 
39 Article 23. See critically Eilís Ferran, Regulation of Private Equity - Backed Leveraged Buyout Activity 
in Europe  25-30 (May 2007). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 84/2007. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=989748. 
40 See Ibid. 14 
 
payments and options would make it harder for companies to design incentive 
compensation schemes aligning managers’ interests with those of shareholders in the 
event of a takeover. More precisely, the Recommendation provides that “[t]ermination 
payments should not exceed a fixed amount or fixed number of years of annual 
remuneration, which should, in general, not be higher than two years of the non-variable 
component of remuneration or the equivalent thereof” and that “[s]hares should not vest 
for at least three years after their award;” further, “[s]hare options or any other right to 
acquire shares or to be remunerated on the basis of share price movements should not be 
exercisable for at least three years after their award.”
41 
As Professors Kahan and Rock have argued, the US corporate environment 
adapted to Delaware courts’ decisions upholding poison pills by making greater use of 
stock options with features such as accelerated vesting upon a change of control.
42 If 
Member States were to implement the Recommendation’s provisions on share-based 
compensation and termination payments, it would become much harder to lure 
directors’ into “accepting” hostile takeovers (i.e. into refraining from adopting available 
defensive tactics, especially in the various countries that have opted out of the board 
neutrality rule) via such a contract-based device.  
This Section and the previous one have briefly outlined the pieces of EU 
takeover regulation that either promote or hamper takeover activity. There was of 
course no pretence to cover absolutely all takeover and takeover-relevant regulations. In 
fact, no mention has been made of the provisions, in the TBD (very few) or elsewhere, 
                                                 
41 See §§ 3.5 and 4, Recommendation complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC 
as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies (C(2009) 3177).  
42 See Ed B. Rock and Marcel Kahan, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive 
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 896 (2002). 15 
 
pertaining to the protection of employees.
43 While it may be argued that they also have a 
(very mildly) adverse impact on takeover activity, I have omitted them for the sake of 
brevity. 
To summarise, the EU rules hampering takeovers are more numerous than those 
promoting them. Because their relative importance varies, it may be subject to debate 
whether the overall outcome is one rather hindering than promoting takeovers. But 
intuitively the current regime leans on the side of hampering them.  
 
5.  The building blocks of a neutral approach 
I have argued that (EU) law should be neutral toward takeovers, i.e. set a 
framework of rules neither subsidising nor hampering takeover activity, while at the 
same time letting individual companies choose whether and how easily their control 
should be reallocated.
44  
That does not imply that there should be no EU law on takeovers, however. In 
fact, while most of the TBD rules making takeovers riskier and costlier or promoting 
them should be scrapped, harmonising measures in this area are still justified on three 
grounds. 
First, the EU’s fundamental aim of promoting market integration makes it a 
good candidate to act as a countervailing force against member states’ tendency to 
                                                 
43 For a description and an assessment of such provisions see Sjåfjell, supra note 3, at 355-66. 
44 In other words, most (EU) rules in this area should be optional for private parties, whether as default 
rules (allowing opt-out) or menu provisions (allowing opt-in). See generally Gérard Hertig and Joseph 
McCahery, Optional Rather Than Mandatory EU Company Law: Framework and Specific Proposals, 
2006 ECFR 341 (advocating a wider use of optional law by EU company lawmakers). 16 
 
devise rules that protect incumbents and therefore hinder takeover activity.
45 In other 
words, EU law should ideally rule out member states’ ability to issue rules of that kind.  
Second, there is a clear conflict of interest between managers or block-holders 
and (other) shareholders in defining a company’s policies vis-à-vis takeovers, whether 
hostile or friendly, and in implementing it. Managers and block-holders will have the 
upper hand at both stages, if anything due to shareholders’ collective action problems, 
and therefore push for a low degree of contestability or greater freedom to sell or 
consolidate control. It makes sense thus for a takeover-neutral policymaker to devise 
default rules that tilt on the side of more contestability (in management-controlled 
companies) and on the side of more shareholder protection (in companies with a 
controlling shareholder).  
Third, because of the mandatory structure of many member states’ company 
laws, both in general and with regard to takeovers specifically, a neutral approach to 
takeovers should aim to remove national company law barriers to contractual freedom 
in designing corporate policies on control contestability. Menu (opt-in) rules could be 
used for this purpose. 
 
a. Limiting member states’ freedom to enact or retain incumbent-friendly rules. 
Well before the TBD, many member states had issued rules hampering takeover 
activity. The EU may have a role in shaping EU takeover policy by enacting pre-
empting rules, i.e. rules that limit member states’ freedom to tamper with takeovers. 
Because of the political saliency of takeovers and of the varying preferences among 
                                                 
45 On such a tendency by lawmakers see e.g. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover 
Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987). More recently, see Guido A. Ferrarini and Geoffrey P. Miller, A 
Simple Theory of Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 301 
(2009). 17 
 
national polities with regard to such transactions, it would be politically impracticable to 
do anything more than setting limits on member states’ takeover-hostile intervention. In 
other words, it is recognized here that an outright ban on takeover-hostile national laws 
would never possibly pass. 
Various EU pre-empting rules can be thought out. Here are some examples. 
1. Because disclosure obligations for owners of major shareholdings discourage 
takeover activity by limiting the freedom of soon-to-be bidders to build toeholds in the 
target company, the EU should prevent member states from defining too low a 
threshold. It should also require member states to grant those who launch a takeover bid 
within, say, one month from the date when the threshold was crossed, an exemption 
from such obligations. Of course, EU legislation should allow individual companies 
freely to “opt down” to a lower initial threshold or “opt up” to a higher one. They 
should also let them opt out of the exemption for prospective bidders. Finally, because 
this is an area in which other policy considerations may drive national policymakers, 
EU legislation should allow Member States, first, to define minimum and maximum 
thresholds, below or above which individual companies may not opt down or up, and, 
second, to define a threshold (not lower than an EU-defined minimum threshold) above 
which even prospective bidders have to disclose their holdings. 
2. EU legislation should not require bidders to publish an offer document. 
Because it has always been a hallmark of takeover legislation, it is realistic to let 
member states retain this requirement. In that case, however, EU legislation should 
specify that national rules may not make its publication conditional upon prior 
authorization by the supervisory authority.
46  
                                                 
46 A rule of this kind would be similar to the provisions in Directives 92/49/EEC and 92/96/EEC that 
prevent member states from requiring prior approval of “general and special policy conditions … [and] 18 
 
3. Similarly, EU legislation should not fix a minimum offer period. It may, 
however, provide for a maximum length of the minimum offer period member states 
might want to impose. In that case, however, EU rules should provide that companies’ 
charters may impose a higher or lower minimum offer period. 
4. Again similarly, EU legislation should not require immediate disclosure of a 
bidder’s intentions, while not preventing Member States from imposing it. However, 
EU rules should require Member States to allow companies to opt out of such a 
requirement. 
5. Finally, it is out of the scope of this paper to assess whether limits on 
termination payments, stock grants and stock options such as those recommended by the 
European Commission
47 are justified in general. But we have seen that compensation 
schemes, like golden parachutes and stock options with accelerated vesting in the event 
of a takeover, have proved an extremely useful device to align managers’ interests to 
those of shareholders in the event of a takeover in a country, like the US, whose law 
admits a board veto on takeovers.
48 Therefore, if those limits are not to be scrapped 
entirely, EU legislation should at least provide that they do not apply to compensation 
devices targeted at takeover situations. By the same token, it should prevent Member 
States from imposing themselves limits on compensation devices that are specifically 
related to takeover events. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
forms and other printed documents which an assurance undertaking intends to use in its dealings with 
policy holders.” See Articles 6, 29 and 39 Council Directive 92/49/EEC of 18 June 1992, and Articles 
6(5), 34 and 45 Directive 2002/83/EC of 5 November 2002.  
47 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 19 
 
b. Default rules protecting (minority) shareholders. The right default rules can 
help private parties reach better outcomes in their negotiations.
49 I follow here Bebchuk 
and Hamdani’s intuition that “[w]henever public officials face a choice between two 
default arrangements, one more restrictive and one less restrictive with respect to 
management, erring on the side of the more restrictive arrangement would carry with it 
a certain important advantage,”
50 i.e. that “relatively little will be lost because both 
shareholders and managers will support a charter amendment opting out of this 
inefficient arrangement.”
51 In contrast, as Bebchuk and Hamdani observe, “when opting 
out requires a charter amendment, if the nonrestrictive arrangement is chosen and then 
turns out to be inefficient, it might often persist despite its inefficiency,”
52 because 
managers (and/or controlling shareholders) might gain in private benefits more than 
they lose qua shareholders.  
In the presence of a trade-off between minority shareholder protection and 
promotion of takeovers, a neutral lawmaker should choose the default rules depending 
on whether investor protection or contestability is more relevant to counter the self-
interested behaviour of the controlling agent. When a dominant shareholder is in place, 
control entrenchment prevails anyway, whereas control transfers can be a form of 
shareholder expropriation. When managers are in control, that risk is less relevant than 
the adverse effects of entrenchment. Default rules should err on the side of minority 
shareholder protection in the former case, and on the side of contestability in the latter. 
Although admittedly it would be difficult to design rules the application of which 
                                                 
49 See generally Ian Ayres, Optional Law, 142-65 (2005). 
50 Lucian A. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for Corporate Law Evolution, 96 NW. U.L. 
REV. 489, 492 (2002). 
51 Id. at 492-3. 
52 Id. at 493. 20 
 
depends on the company’s control structure, there are five issues in takeover law that 
the EU would best legislate upon via default rules of this kind. 
1. First, because the mandatory bid rule is a safeguard for minority shareholders 
in the event of opportunistic control transfers, it would make sense for the EU to craft it 
as a default rule. Individual companies should be free to opt out. Of course, this may 
imply that a higher than optimal number of companies would be subject to the 
mandatory bid rule than if there was no such default. But because the current regime in 
the EU provides for no opt-out, under the proposed rule European companies would be 
at least no less open to (friendly and hostile) takeovers than they are now, and some of 
them may become more so.  
2. Action in concert is a necessary anti-evasion component of the mandatory bid 
rule, but it also has a negative impact on useful forms of coordination among 
shareholders for monitoring and governance purposes and therefore may harm minority 
shareholders’ overall position in a given company. Because the overall effect on 
minority shareholders is unclear, EU legislation may define “acting in concert” for the 
purposes of the mandatory bid rule strictly (i.e., so as not to hamper minority 
shareholder coordination on governance issues), but grant individual companies the 
freedom to provide for a different (whether stricter or broader) definition. 
3. Tender offers launched by shareholders already controlling the company, 
normally with a view to delisting it (internal tender offers), are functionally equivalent 
to self-dealing transactions.
53 Because collective action problems may lead shareholders 
to accept low-ball bids that allow dominant shareholders to appropriate a 
disproportionate share of the company’s value, EU default rules should provide for 
                                                 
53 See e.g. Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PENN. L. 
REV. 785 (2003). 21 
 
mechanisms to protect minority shareholders, such as a separate approval of the bid by a 
majority of the tendering shareholders. (Member States should, however, be free to treat 
such transactions as self-dealing ones, and accordingly apply their rules on self-dealing 
also to companies opting out of the EU default rules on internal tender offers.) 
4. Article 9 of the TBD sets the board neutrality rule as an “EU” default, in the 
sense that member states are free not to implement it even as a default, provided they 
allow companies to opt into it, which no one does in member states that do opt out of 
board neutrality.
54 Given managers’ aspiration to be protected from takeovers on the 
one hand, and shareholders’ collective action problems in obtaining a charter 
amendment, on the other, it will be much easier for a company to opt-out of the default 
board neutrality rule than to opt into it if “no neutrality” was the default. Therefore, 
Article 9 should be converted into a real default rule for EU companies: member states 
would have to implement it as a default rule, and only individual companies would be 
free to opt out.
55  
5. Finally, the squeeze-out rule is an effective solution to the free riding problem 
in takeovers. EU legislation should require Member States to grant acquirers of 
corporate control, whether via a takeover bid or otherwise, the squeeze-out right in 
broad terms (such as following the acquisition of a simple majority of the shares), but 
companies should be free to “opt up” to a higher threshold or to opt out completely. 
Again, managers (and de facto controlling shareholders) will have sufficient incentives 
to opt up or opt out if the default is pro-takeovers. To be sure, the squeeze-out right 
could also be (ab)used by dominant shareholders outside the takeover context. But 
                                                 
54 See e.g. Paul L. Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster and Emilie Van de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeover 
Directive as a Protectionist Tool? 53 (February 2010). ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 141/2010. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616. 
55 See Id. at 54-56 (similarly advocating an optional EU board neutrality regime). 22 
 
given the default on internal tender offers, the possibility of a squeeze-out following an 
internal tender offer either is taken care of by the different default rule outlined above or 
is just a by-product of opting out of such a default rule. 
c. Menu rules. The mandatory structure of company law in many European 
countries and at the EU level can hinder individual companies’ ability to devise 
protections against takeovers. Such protections are not necessarily bad for shareholders. 
They may serve the legitimate interests of incumbent managers or dominant 
shareholders, who might want stability of control as a quid pro quo for firm-specific 
human capital investments and/or for management monitoring. They may also aim to 
solve shareholders’ collective action problems vis-à-vis takeover bids. And they may do 
both.  
The EU should enact menu rules that allow individual companies to deviate 
from the legally defined (and in some countries legally mandated) degree of control 
contestability. For example, EU legislation should require member states to allow 
companies to grant the board of directors a veto power on takeover bids or any other 
equivalent mechanism (like a poison pill).
56 A provision like that would be extremely 
useful to permit companies that opted out of the board neutrality rule not to enter 
potentially harmful courses of action (such as leveraged cash-outs) to fend off hostile 
bids. In fact, a veto power or a poison pill work, as Jeffrey Gordon put it, like a neutron 
bomb: they “eliminate the hostile bidder but leave the target assets unscathed.”
57 
Opening to this kind of defences would allow EU policymakers to leave Second 
                                                 
56 It should of course be possible to restrict the veto power (or use of the poison pill) to specific kinds of 
bids (such as coercive ones, or those with a premium lower than x percent above market price). A no-
poison pill default would be in the same logic as Bebchuk and Hamdani’s theory of default rules in 
corporate law. See Bebchuk and Hamdani, supra note 50, especially at 513-5. 
57 See Jeffrey N. Gordon,  Poison Pills and the European Case, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 839, 842 (2000). 23 
 
Company Law Directive restrictions on dividends and so forth
58 in place, because the 
defences they hamper are simply not needed once a veto power is available.
59 Similarly, 
EU legislation should require member states to allow companies to adopt mechanisms, 
other than a board veto, that solve shareholders’ collective action problems vis-à-vis 
bidders. For instance, companies should be allowed to require bidders to re-open bids 
for their shares once the offer has become unconditional.  
Further, although the practical impact would be very limited, EU legislation 
should require Member States to allow companies to opt into the break-through rule 
(Article 11 TBD),
60 while there would be no reason for changing the current TBD 
provision allowing Member States to let companies opt into reciprocity.
61 
Finally, Articles 23 and 23a of the Second Company Law Directive make 
leverage buy-outs more costly, while hardly protecting the interests of creditors.
62 An 
overhaul of EU takeover regulation could amend those provisions so as to make them 
menu rules: Member States would be required to allow companies to adopt the 
safeguards they provide for. While in many Member States such a contractual choice 
might be possible with no need for an EU menu provision, in others it may be necessary 
to override mandatory rules e.g. in the area of power allocation between the board and 
the general meeting. 
 
6.  Anticipated criticisms 
                                                 
58 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
59 Of course, the point here is not that it would be wise to leave such rules in place (see Luca Enriques and 
Jonathan R. Macey, Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The Case Against the European Legal Capital 
Rules, (2001) 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1165), but rather that we could ignore the negative effect of such rules 
on takeover activity. 
60 The break-through rule is provided for in Article 11 TBD. 
61 Article 12(3)-(5) TBD. To be sure, the restrictions in paragraph (5) could be relaxed. 
62 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 24 
 
Various criticisms to the proposed approach can be anticipated and briefly 
commented upon. One could argue, first, that our proposal would lower the safeguards 
for shareholders and other stakeholders, running contrary to the very foundation of EU 
takeover regulation, which is to be found in Article 50(2)(g) of the Treaty. However, it 
is easy to counter that most existing statutory safeguards against takeovers are in fact 
anti-takeover measures that individual companies could, at least functionally, replicate 
in their corporate charters. Those in control within corporations, whether managers or 
dominant shareholders, have in fact strong incentives to introduce such safeguards.  
Under the policy approach proposed here, there might well be companies that 
opt for a higher degree of contestability than envisaged by current EU mandatory rules. 
These companies would be more prone to (hostile) takeovers and, inevitably, bad 
takeover practices. It is, however, impossible to say whether such companies’ 
shareholders would be worse off: they should be held to have traded protection against 
bad takeover practices for a higher likelihood of takeovers, with the related gains and 
the ensuing greater market discipline for managers. As to other constituencies, such as 
creditors and employees, again in most companies they should gain in protections from 
controlling agents’ tendency to raise barriers against takeovers.  
Another criticism might be that, leaving so much scope for contractual freedom, 
and given controlling agents’ incentives to adopt takeover-hostile charter provisions, the 
final outcome of such a model shift would be an even less takeover-friendly regime than 
is currently in place. The easy and blunt answer to such criticism, given the theoretical 
starting point that takeovers are neither good nor bad, so that policymakers should 
neither promote nor hinder them would be: so what? More politely, this criticism, if 
relevant (which is hard to assess, because it is impossible to predict the decrease in 25 
 
contestability of control following individual companies’ contractual choices in a 
setting in which shareholders would have the final word
63), would only make the neutral 
approach less politically palatable and therefore less feasible. But it would not 
invalidate the foundations of a neutral approach. 
Similarly, one may object that leaving companies free to decide whether and 
how minority shareholders should be protected in the event of a control transfer means 
granting majority shareholders such a freedom. Even conceding that these will fully 
internalize the costs of such a choice at the IPO stage, leaving those shareholders free to 
opt out of the mandatory bid rule and other takeover-related protections for minority 
shareholders midstream not only would redistribute value from minority to majority 
shareholders but may also be inefficient.
64 To address this criticism, however, one may 
qualify the proposals on mandatory bids and internal tender offers made above so as to 
require a qualified majority (or a majority of the minority) as a condition to the opt-out 
decision by individual companies that are already listed on the stock exchange at the 
time the proposed regime enters into force. There would be no need to extend this 
regime to companies going public thereafter, because at the IPO stage markets should 
be able to discount no-opt-out decisions that are not reinforced by a qualified majority 
or a majority of the minority clause for future opt-outs.  
Further, one may counter that takeover law should not be moulded as an isolated 
piece of legislation, because it has obvious interactions with other corporate and 
securities law rules. If such rules are non-neutral themselves, then the overall picture of 
                                                 
63 This would be the fundamental difference between the proposed neutral approach and the current US 
regime, in which, whether by default or as a matter of State law, managers are in control of the decision 
of how contestable a company is to be. Arguably, nowhere in Europe do the legal rules concerning the 
process by which corporate charters are amended distort it in favor of management as much as in the US. 
64 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable 
Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820 (1989). 26 
 
laws more broadly affecting takeover activity might also be less neutral than envisaged. 
In the previous sections I have shown that a review of EU takeover law would better 
also take other pieces of legislation that do affect takeover activity into account. But 
eventually, we cannot expect the EU to revise all company and securities law rules 
having an even more indirect effect on takeovers. So, indeed it is possible that the final 
outcome of a review according to the proposed approach will not be complete 
neutrality. But it would also be the case that, by scrapping most antitakeover laws at the 
EU level while at the same time introducing pre-emptive rules against protectionist 
national measures and pro-shareholders and pro-bidders defaults, the outcome will be 
more neutral than is currently the case. 
A final criticism could be that giving so much contractual freedom to individual 
companies would raise uncertainty in the market as to each company’s degree of control 
contestability, thus raising transaction costs for potential bidders. Again, the easy 
answer from a takeover-neutral perspective, even assuming that so much greater 
differentiation would ensue than is currently observed, is: so what? However, if this 
argument is thought to be significant, one could overcome it by retaining Article 10 
TBD, which requires disclosure of individual companies’ ownership structure and anti-
takeover devices. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
I have argued that policymakers cannot assume that takeovers, whether hostile 
or friendly, are necessarily good or bad. Nor can they craft takeover rules that hinder all 
bad takeovers on the one hand, and promote exclusively good ones on the other. As a 
consequence, the (EU) regulation of takeovers should aspire to be neutral. I have 27 
 
described how such a neutral, mainly optional EU framework could look like and 
addressed likely criticisms to the proposed framework. It is not obvious whether the 
regime resulting from the neutral approach would overall be more or less takeover-
hostile than the current EU one, because (national and) contractual choices may tilt 
towards incumbents protection as opposed to contestability. But given the political 
hurdles to an enhanced TBD regime, it might be worth considering the neutral 
approach, or some of its building blocks, as a possible alternative. NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
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